Much of the complaint focuses on the securitization process by which Duross's loan was sold into a trust. On May 29, 2015, Duross brought the instant action in Plymouth Superior Court against Scudder Bay and Kearney. In June 2014, Scudder Bay sold the property to defendant Kearney for $490,000.Ģ. A judgment for possession entered in favor of Scudder Bay on May 17, 2013. On or about May 16, 2013, a Housing Court judge allowed Scudder Bay's motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, Scudder Bay brought a summary process action in the Southeast Housing Court to evict Duross and her children. Scudder Bay foreclosed on August 20, 2012, was the top bidder at its own auction, and purchased the property for $100,000. After various assignments to various entities, Duross's mortgage was assigned to Scudder Bay in June 2010. Duross's note was secured by a mortgage on the property given to Option One as mortgagee. On April 18, 2006, Duross signed a note payable to Option One Mortgage Corporation (Option One) in the amount of $600,000. On or about July 31, 1997, Duross purchased the home known as 120 South Street, Hingham (the property). We reverse so much of the judgment in favor of Scudder Bay as dismisses Duross's claims predicated on acts or omissions unrelated to the title question.īackground. 239, § 7, does not bar application of the doctrine of issue preclusion to summary process judgments determining title. We affirm the dismissal of all claims predicated on Duross's theory that the foreclosure was ineffective to pass title to Scudder Bay. Duross now appeals from judgments that dismissed her claims as precluded byĪ judgment in an earlier eviction case. Seeking recovery of her home after what she claims was an ineffective foreclosure, the plaintiff, Tammy Duross, sued the foreclosing mortgagee, Scudder Bay Capital, LLC (Scudder Bay), and its postforeclosure buyer, Alan M. White, Jr., for Scudder Bay Capital, LLC. Gaziano, J., and a motion to dismiss claims against the foreclosing mortgagee was heard by Christopher J. ĬIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 29, 2015.Ī pretrial motion to dismiss a claim against the postforeclosure buyer was heard by Frank M. 239, § 7, operated to bar the application of issue preclusion based on a summary process judgment in which title actually had been determined. In a civil action brought in the Superior Court by the plaintiff mortgagor challenging the validity of a foreclosure by the defendant mortgagee and the sale of the home to the defendant postforeclosure buyer, following an earlier summary process action in the Housing Court in which a judge allowed summary judgment in favor of the defendant mortgagee, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of the same issue in the Superior Court, where the key issue, i.e., the defendant mortgagee's authority to foreclose, was identical to the primary issue litigated in the Housing Court eviction case where the issue was essential to the Housing Court's judgment and where nothing suggested that G. 833 JanuCourt Below: Superior Court, Plymouth County Present: Milkey, Hanlon, & Sacks, JJ.
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